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SECURING THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INTELLECTUAL




In any economist's account of what makes a successful economy the
institution of private property is never too far away and is usually central.
Douglass North, in answering his question "[w]hy aren't all the countries in
the world rich?", concludes that countries create well-defined property
rights that stimulate individuals into productive activity by raising the level
of private return to meet the social return.1 Theories that advance an
institutional explanation of development include widely distributed and
enforceable property rights as a key institution that promotes development. 2
Well-defined and secure property rights are part of the package of reforms
that were advocated by the Washington consensus.
The efficiency gains and economic growth effects of private property
rights depend upon those rights being linked to an enforcement procedure.
Property rights that are not tied to an enforcement procedure of some kind
run the risk of failing to be secure. Enforcement mechanisms for property
are fundamental to the creation of expectations in individuals about whether
or not they have security and control over time with respect to an asset.
Intellectual property rights represent an interesting enforcement challenge
because copying capabilities are diffusing throughout the world (the
Internet being the most obvious example), the incentives to copy are
increasing and enforcement depends on a costly legal infra-structure. On
top of this, the broader cultural legitimacy of intellectual property rights,
upon which effective enforcement ultimately depends, is not evolving in the
way many intellectual property owners would like because intellectual
property rights have become the targets of critical campaigning. The civil
society campaigns on biopiracy and access-to-medicines are two examples
t Professor, RegNet, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.
1 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD:
A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 2-3 (1973).
2 See Daron Acemoglu, Root Causes: A Historical Approach to Assessing the Role of
Institutions in Economic Development, FIN. & DEV., June 2003, at 27, 27.
3 John Williamson, Democracy and the "Washington Consensus, " 21 WORLD
DEVELOPMENT 1329, 1333 (1993).
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of global campaigns that have placed intellectual property rights at the root
of the problem.4
This article shows how intellectual property owners are meeting some
of the many challenges raised by having to enforce intellectual property
across borders, in global markets and in sometimes morally controversial
circumstances. Drawing on the theory of enforcement pyramids,5 the
theory of forum shifting and the theory of nodal governance,7 the paper
shows how the nodal co-ordination of an international enforcement pyramid
offers non-state actors the possibility of securing compliance by states with
emerging global standards of intellectual property rights. Whether or not
the enforcement of these global standards of intellectual property will
generate efficiency gains for states is a separate question that this paper
does not answer. However, the final section of the paper draws attention to
the link between the enforcement pyramid and the problem of unproductive
property rights. Intellectual property is an area where there is a serious risk
of rent-seeking behavior.8 The global intellectual property ratchet and its
accompanying international enforcement pyramid offer the possibility of
securing global rents.
4 For examples of the arguments of civil society, see Oxfam, Fatal Side Effects: Medicine
Patents Under the Microscope, available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/cutthecost; MEDECINS
SANs FRONTItRES ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES CAMPAIGN AND THE DRUGS FOR
NEGLECTED DISEASES WORKING GROUP, FATAL IMBALANCE: THE CRISIS IN RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT FOR DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES (2001), available at
http://www.accessmed-msf.org. For more information on biopriacy, see Vandana Shiva,
Protecting our Biological and Intellectual Heritage in the Age of Biopiracy, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 141 (Peter Drahos ed., 1999).
5 See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL
MINE SAFETY 142 - 147 (1985) (discussing the enforcement pyramids as applied to the
American Mine Safety and Health Act) [hereinafter To PUNISH OR PERSUADE]; LAN AYRES &
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE
35 -41 (1992) (discussing pyramid strategies of responsive regulation).
6 See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 564
- 577 (2000) (discussing international forum shifting).
7 See generally LES JOHNSTON & CLIFFORD SHEARING, GOVERNING SECURITY:
EXPLORATIONS IN POLICING AND JUSTICE 138 - 160 (2003) (exploring one basis for
integrating the governance of security and justice and suggesting that the model of 'nodal
governance' provides a useful framework within which to situate normative questions about
the governance of security); Clifford Shearing & Jennifer Wood, Nodal Governance,
Democracy, and the New Denizens, 30 J.L. & Soc'Y 400 (2003) (exploring normative
implications of nodal governance with an emphasis on the 'governance disparity' that is
paralleling the 'wealth disparity' across the globe).
I See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 16 - 17 (2003).
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II. The Global Intellectual Property Ratchet
During the period that the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was being negotiated (1986-1993)
there were suggestions that if developing countries agreed to TRIPS the
U.S. would ease off negotiating intellectual property standards bilaterally.
9
During the 1980s the U.S. had set the scene for TRIPS through a series of
strategic bilateral negotiations on intellectual property with countries like
South Korea and Brazil. An incentive that was held out to developing
countries for the successful negotiation of TRIPS was that the U.S. would
desist from using its trade enforcement tools to obtain the standards that it
wanted.
After TRIPS was concluded the U.S. actually intensified the level of
its bilateral activity. It used its trade enforcement tools under its Trade Act
of 1974 to review the intellectual property standards of more and more
countries and it concluded many more bilateral agreements related to
intellectual property than it had in the 1980s. 10 In effect it had created,
without anybody really noticing, a global regulatory ratchet for intellectual
property. Moreover, the ratchet only traveled in the direction of stronger
standards.
The U.S. was the principal architect of the global regulatory ratchet for
intellectual property, with the EU to a lesser extent also making use of it.1
In short form, this ratcheting process is dependent upon:
(a) a process of forum shifting - a strategy in which the U.S. and EU
shift the standard-setting agenda from fora in which they are encountering
difficulties to those fora where they are likely to succeed;
(b) coordinated bilateral and multilateral strategies for intellectual
property; and
(c) the entrenchment in agreements on intellectual property of a
principle of a minimum-but-not-maximum standard of protection.
Forum-shifting in international regulation is made up of three basic
strategies - moving an agenda from one organization to another, leaving an
organization and pursuing agendas simultaneously in more than one
organization. 12 The basic reason for forum-shifting is that it increases the
forum-shifter's chances of victory. The rules and modes of operation of
each international organization constitute the pay-offs that a state might
9 See, e.g., Emory Simon, Remarks of Mr. Emory Simon, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
310367, 370 (1989) (statement by a member of the USTR at Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property symposium).
10 See Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 791, 792 (2001).
11BRAITHWAITE & DRAHos, supra note 6, at 566.
12Id. at 564.
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expect to receive if it plays in that particular forum. Forum-shifting is a
way of constituting a new game. Facing defeat or a sub-optimal result in
one forum, a state may gain a better result by shifting its agenda to a new
forum. In their study of global business regulation Braithwaite and Drahos
found that forum-shifting had become important after the Second World
War and that the U.S. state was the main state to make use of it.
13
The principle of minimum-but-not-maximum protection plays a vital
role in the regulatory ratchet. Each bilateral or multilateral agreement
dealing with intellectual property contains a provision to the effect that a
party to such an agreement may implement more extensive protection than
is required under the agreement or that the agreement does not derogate
from other agreements providing even more favorable treatment. 14  This
means that each subsequent bilateral or multilateral agreement can establish
a higher standard.
The global ratchet for intellectual property consists of waves of
bilaterals (beginning in the 1980s) followed by occasional multilateral
standard-setting exercises (See Diagram 1 below). Each wave of bilaterals
or multilateral treaty never derogates from existing standards and very often
sets new ones.
3 Id. at 564-65.
14 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Nov. 1992, art. 1702, 33 I.L.M. 605
(1992); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81, art. 1.1 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS]; United States - Jordan Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 24, 2000, U.S.-
Jord., art. 4.1, available at http://www.jordanusfta.com/documents/textagr.pdf (last visited
Nov. 9, 2004); United States - Australia Free Trade Agreement, May 16, 2004, U.S.-Austl.,
art. 17.1.5, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/Bilateral/AustraliaFTA/
FinalText/SectionIndex.html [hereinafter Australia FTA].
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Diagram 1 - The Global Intellectual Property Ratchet
Bilaterals (e.g. U.S.-Korea, 1986) q Multilaterals (TRIP, WIPO)
Regional (NAFTA) .... R




The dash arrows indicate that the U.S. has the capacity and resources
to pursue negotiations in different fora at the same time. Where the U.S. or
the EU are at any given moment in the cycle of ratcheting is determined
essentially by how much effective resistance they are meeting in terms of
their negotiating objectives. The bilateralism that preceded TRIPS and that
laid the foundation for TRIPS was triggered by the resistance that the U.S.
encountered on its intellectual property agenda at the GATT. 15 Presently, it
is clear that the U.S. is in a bilateral phase. The Ministerial Declaration that
launched the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations in 2001
contained only a modest work program in relation to TRIPS with
geographical indications being the principal item listed for negotiation.'
6
Bilaterally, however, the U.S. has been busily negotiating free trade
agreements (FTAs) with countries that it sees as being important regional
models. Table 1 below provides an indication of recent activity by the U.S.
in the negotiation of FTAs:
15 PETER DRAHOs & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 134 (2002).
16 See Ministerial Conference, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/i, paras. 17-
19 (Nov. 20, 2001).
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Table 1 - The U.S. and Recent Free Trade Agreements and
Negotiations
Passed by Concluded, but not Passed by Ongoing or to
Congress Congress Commence
Jordan Costa Rica (2004) Bahrain
(2001)
Chile El Salvador (2004) Bolivia
(2003)
Singapore Guatemala (2004) Botswana
(2003)
Australia Honduras (2004) Colombia
(2004)








The focus on FTAs at this time can also be explained in terms of the
effective resistance that the U.S. has been encountering at the TRIPS
Council over the last several years. 17 The TRIPS Council was the venue in
which African states in June of 2001 launched an initiative aimed at
examining the role of intellectual property rights in access to medicines.
The end of 2001 saw WTO members agree to the Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, a Declaration that the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry counted as a blow against its interests and which it did its best to
downplay. 18 Similarly, the review of Article 27(3)(b) that was started in
1999 has not run the way that the U.S. would have liked. In essence the
U.S. wants to bring TRIPS into line with what is its own domestic
17 Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-
Setting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 774, 780-783 (2002).
18 See Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J.
481, 518-519 (2001-02).
[Vol. 36:53
SECURING THE FUTURE OF IP
position--"virtually anything is patentable."' 9  Instead, what eventuated
during the course of the review was a very wide-ranging dialogue in the
TRIPS Council that raised many issues about patents, including the need to
better integrate the provisions of TRIPS with a regulatory approach towards
biodiversity that states had agreed to in the context of the Convention on
Biological Diversity. 20 Developing countries were able to resist U.S.
proposals in the context of the TRIPS Council because outside of the
Council they were being given assistance by civil society actors.2 1 These
actors were helping to provide technical expertise, and through global
campaigning they proved highly effective at raising questions about the
origins of TRIPS and its moral legitimacy. This in turn expanded the art of
the possible when it came to TRIPS. Moreover, it was to the advantage of
both civil society and developing countries that the TRIPS Council was one
highly visible forum on which they could concentrate their resources.
This effective resistance in the TRIPS Council has led to forum-
shifting by the U.S. In the FTAs that it has recently concluded it has sought
and, in many cases, obtained standards of intellectual property from the
other state that bring that state closer to the U.S. domestic position.22 A
good illustration can be found in the provisions of the U.S.-Singapore FTA
that deal with patents. Under the U.S.-Singapore FTA the parties may only
exclude those inventions from patentability that are specified in Article 27.2
and 27.3(a) of TRIPS.23 In other words, Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS has been
bypassed. TRIPS also bars its members from using its provisions to
address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.24 The
19 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S., 148 F.3d 1384, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
20 For an overview and summary, see Boniface Guwa Chidyausiku, Article 27.3(b) of the
TRIPS Agreement: The Review Process and Developments at National and Regional Levels,
in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE, AND
SUSTAINABILITY 101 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003).
21 See Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT'L L. J.,
481; Ruth Mayne, The Global Campaign on Patents and Access to Medicines: An Oxfam
Perspective, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE ACCESS AND
DEVELOPMENT 244-258 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002).
22 Under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 the Congress has stated
that one overall negotiating objective for the U.S. is to obtain in bilateral and multilateral
agreements provisions that "reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in United
States law." 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4).
23 See United States - Singapore Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, U.S.-Sing., art.
16.7. 1, at http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/singapore.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2004) [hereinafter
Singapore FTAJ.
24 See TRIPS, supra note 14, at art. 6.
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U.S.-Singapore FTA, however, deals with the exhaustion issue by requiring
each Party to give the patent owner a remedy against a third party who
disturbs a contractual arrangement between a patent owner and licensee. 25
TRIPS does not specifically address the rights of generic manufacturers to
make use of a patented drug prior to the patent expiring for the purposes of
obtaining marketing approval of their generic product from their relevant
regulatory authority. However, as Canada pointed out in the Canada-
European Community pharmaceutical products case, the understanding of
key players such as the U.S. in the TRIPS negotiations was that this
exception was preserved by Article 30 of TRIPS.26 Moreover, the state
practice after TRIPS came into force was also consistent with the
understanding that a regulatory review exception was permitted by Article
30.27
In principle, Article 30 would permit a variety of approaches to
regulating the relationship between generic pharmaceutical companies and
originator companies. FTAs are, however, circumscribing the openness of
Article 30 in TRIPS. These agreements contain detailed standards on the
issue of access to patented pharmaceutical products by generic companies
for the purposes of obtaining marketing approval. In the case of the U.S.-
Singapore FTA, use by a third party of the patent is limited to obtaining
marketing approval including in cases where the export of the generic
version is permitted.28  It follows that, if a Singaporean generic
manufacturer could take advantage of an export market that was not patent-
barred, it would not be able to export in commercial quantities to that
market until the patent in Singapore had expired. The compulsory licensing
provision of the U.S.-Singapore FTA is, unlike TRIPS, drawn in the
negative. 29 This means that compulsory licensing is prohibited except in
specified circumstances (to remedy anticompetitive acts, for public non-
commercial use, national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency).3 ° It also contains an express restriction on the transfer of "know
how", something not to be found in TRIPS. A country like Singapore that
agrees to this kind of provision on compulsory licensing is clearly
25 Singapore FTA, supra note 23, at art. 16.7.2.
26 See The Report of the Panel on Panel on Canada, Canada - Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products, Complaint by the European Communities and Their Member
States: Report of the Panel, Mar. 17, 2000, WT/DS I 14/R, at para. 4.15 (2000).
27 Canada pointed out that Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Argentina, Australia and
Israel had all allowed an exception to patent rights for the purposes of generic producers
obtaining marketing approval. See id.
28 Singapore FTA, supra note 23, at art. 16.7.5.
29 Id. at art. 16.7.6.
30 The U.S. pushed for such a compulsory licensing provision in the context of the TRIPS
negotiations but was unsuccessful. See JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 320-21 (2001).
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circumscribing the rights it would otherwise have under TRIPS to enact a
wider provision.
It is also worth noting that countries by adopting this kind of provision
for compulsory licensing in their patent law may be going even further than
the U.S. does. Compulsory licensing is not part of U.S. patent law, but
provisions on compulsory licensing are to be found in other parts of U.S.
law such as the Clean Air Act and the Atomic Energy Act.31 In addition,
compulsory licenses are a key remedy in the context of antitrust litigation.
Countries that adopt a restrictive approach to compulsory licensing as part
of their patent law and do not compensate by having licensing access
provisions in other parts of their law, or do not have strong competition law
and authorities, are clearly offering patent owners stronger rights than exist
in U.S. domestic law.
Another example of the way in which the U.S. is using FTAs to bring
other countries into line with its own domestic provisions is to be found in
Article 16.8 of the U.S.-Singapore FTA. This provision deals with the
treatment of information by a regulatory authority that relates to the safety
or efficacy of a pharmaceutical or agricultural product and is required to be
submitted by that authority for the purposes of obtaining marketing
approval. TRIPS deals with this situation somewhat succinctly in Article
39.3. Members are required to protect such data against "unfair
commercial use" provided that it required "considerable effort" to generate,
that it is undisclosed and that it is a new chemical entity. The U.S.-
Singapore FTA takes this open and flexible standard and converts it into
something much more specific. Under it Singaporean authorities cannot, in
effect, rely on the information that has been submitted for the purposes of
giving approval to a third party (a generic manufacturer) unless, of course,
the original party submitting the information consents to such use. The
period of non-reliance is five years for pharmaceutical products and ten
years for agricultural chemical products. This obligation to maintain the
exclusivity of the data applies even if it has not been submitted in
Singapore but in another country, and Singaporean authorities are relying
on marketing approval by a regulatory authority in that country. Further the
obligation to maintain this exclusivity of data is independent of the period
of patent protection in the product. These provisions essentially bring
Singapore into line with U.S. law.32
31 See Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in
the United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a
Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv., 1623, 1681-1682 (2001).
32 See WATAL, supra note 30, at 200-01; see also Singapore FTA, supra note 23, at art.
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IlL Intellectual Property Owners and their Nodally Coordinated
Enforcement Pyramid
The previous section showed how the U.S. has, through a strategy of
forum shifting, been able to create a global intellectual property ratchet.
Putting higher and higher standards of intellectual property rights on the
books is only the first step. From an economic point of view the private
property right over an asset must also be accompanied by a belief that the
property right is secure and that the economic benefits of the asset will
actually flow to the owner. This in turn requires an enforcement procedure
of some kind. One of the important achievements of TRIPS was to oblige
many states to enact enforcement procedures, civil and criminal, to deal
with the infringement of intellectual property. From the point of view of
developing states the costly investment in enforcement would be to the
benefit of mainly foreign intellectual property owners.33 Assuming such
states to be rational actors with limited resources, one would predict that
they would enact enforcement procedures and then turn a blind eye to
actual enforcement. From the point of view of intellectual property owners,
compliance by governments with their obligations, especially on
enforcement, is the single most important goal to be achieved.
This section of the paper argues that intellectual property owners have
sought to achieve the goal of compliance through the creation of an
international enforcement pyramid that is nodally coordinated. The theory
behind enforcement pyramids is well known and summarized briefly below.
We will also see that use by the U.S. of its trade enforcement tools follows
pyramidal theory. The distinctive feature of this international enforcement
pyramid is its nodal co-ordination by private sector actors. Nodes are
specific organizational means through which the resources of multiple
networks are concentrated to produce action. The crucial point about
nodally coordinated pyramids is that the enforcement reach of the pyramid
increases. In the case of intellectual property rights, the pyramid has real
international reach and offers private sector actors a means by which to
achieve the goal of secure intellectual property rights. Whether all of these
rights are in fact productive property rights is a separate issue.
A. Enforcement Pyramids
After John Braithwaite's development of the theory of the enforcement
pyramid a considerable body of scholarship has shown both theoretically
33 See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, at 15-20, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/1, U.N. Sales No. 96.II.D. 10 (1996) (noting
cost and benefits stemming from the TRIPS agreement).
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and empirically how enforcement pyramids can increase compliance.34 The
key idea behind the pyramid is that punishment and persuasion should be
linked in a certain sequence that begins with persuasion at the base of the
pyramid and ends with the most punitive sanction at the apex of the
pyramid. The assumption about human nature that lies behind this linkage
sequence is that there are different actor types (e.g. rational, virtuous,
irrational). The different enforcement levels of the pyramid are aimed at
these different types. At the base of the pyramid are the 'soft' tools of
regulation such as guidelines, protocols and educational strategies, or in
generic language the tools of dialogue and persuasion. These soft tools
assume that actors are disposed to do the "right thing" and are willing to co-
operate. As one moves up the pyramid, the tools of regulation begin to
assume a more coercive character until, at the top of the pyramid, there is
some form of incapacitation (this depends on the area of regulation but may
involve imprisonment, suspension of trade, loss of license and so on).
Where the regulator is unsuccessful at the bottom of the pyramid he or she
can move up the pyramid to deploy more coercive tools. An enforcement
pyramid gives a regulator a unified set of regulatory strategies that can be
deployed against all types of actors (virtuous, rationally calculating,
resistant, incompetent). As one type of strategy fails because of the type of
actor involved, another is wheeled into place. Advocates of the
enforcement pyramid argue that there should be a presumption in favor of
starting at the base of the pyramid with dialogic and information-based
strategies.35 This is less costly, more respectful and ultimately makes the
use of coercion more legitimate, because non-coercive strategies have been
given a chance to work.
The use by the U.S. of its trade enforcement tools in the context of
trade disputes including intellectual property follows the shape of an
enforcement pyramid (see Diagram 2 below). 36 Typically, the U.S. will
begin an informal dialogue with a state if it believes that the state is not
meeting standards of adequate and effective protection for intellectual
property. Over time the dialogue becomes more formal. If the state fails to
act, it finds itself being listed for more serious attention. The various lists
that are kept by the USTR allow the USTR to make finely tuned escalations
34 First put forward in JOH'N BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF
COAL MINE SAFETY, (1985); see also IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 35-38 (1992); JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND & RESPONSIVE REGULATION (2002) [hereinafter RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE].
35 See RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 30.
36 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is the principal enforcement tool. 19 U.S.C. §
2411 (1999).
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in deterrence.37 It also means that states that make attempts to fix up their
intellectual property problem can be taken off a list or shifted to a less
serious one. Building forgiveness and reward into the pyramid adds to its
reasonableness and ultimately effectiveness, because those on the receiving
end can see the pyramid is not about unreasoning coercion. At the apex of
the pyramid lie trade sanctions such as the withdrawal of trade benefits or
the imposition of duties on goods coming into the U.S. market.
The ability of the USTR to wipe out the U.S. domestic market of
another country across a range of products is a big stick, but it is
infrequently used by the U.S. 38  The theory and empirical work on
enforcement pyramids shows that regulatory agencies that carry big sticks
rarely use them.39 Its simple presence combined with a belief about the
inexorability of its use leads most targets of the pyramid to comply before
the big stick is actually wielded. At the same time the occasional use of the
big stick projects credibility and makes the targets of enforcement in the
lower reaches of the pyramid think harder about the potential costs of non-
compliance. A recent statement by the current USTR, Robert Zoellick,
neatly captures this pyramidal thinking:
"We resolve most problems without resorting to formal dispute
proceedings, which take additional time and involve uncertain outcomes.
Most U.S. companies suggest formal dispute proceedings only as a last
resort. When we determine it will be the most effective we [sic]to settle
disputes, we pursue cases under the WTO, NAFTA, or our new FTAs. ''4
37 The Special 301 List is made up of Priority Foreign Countries, the Priority Watch List
and the Watch List. These last two lists have been created by the USTR. There are statutory
criteria for the identification of Priority Foreign Countries. See 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (b) (1999).
38 See DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 15, at 99.
39 AYREs & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 34, at 40-41.
40 The Administration 's International Trade Agenda: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 108th Cong. 4 (2004) (statement of Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade
Representative).
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Diagram 2 - U.S. Trade Enforcement Tools as an Enforcement
Pyramid for Intellectual Property Rights
B. The Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid
The idea of nodal coordination derives from recent theoretical
approaches that make networks and nodes the principal categories in
theorizing about changes in governance.41 Manuel Castells, for example,
argues that networks have overcome their historical weaknesses in
coordinating functions and in bringing resources to bear on goals by
41 See, e.g., Manuel Castells, Materials for an Exploratory Theory of the Network Society,
51 BRIT. J. Soc. 5 (2000) (proposing some elements for a grounded theory of the network
society); R.A.W. RHODES, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE: POLICY NETWORKS,
GOVERNANCE, REFLEXIVITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (1997) (looking at policy networks in
political science); Shearing & Wood, supra note 7 (arguing that theories of nodal
governance can strengthen the financial value and democratic efficiency of poor
communities).
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becoming information networks.42 These networks have adaptability and
superior levels of coordination and management of complexity. The
principal effect of information networks is changes in power relationships
that see traditional centers of power bypassed by new networks of capital,
production, trade and communication.
Power must still be exercised in the networked world. Nodal
governance is a theory that focuses on the role of nodes in governance and
especially in the way that networks can be linked to create concentrations of
power for the purposes of exercising governance. Nodes are either actors
within a network or the organizational product of two or more networks
being tied together for a common purpose. This latter type of node (termed
a 'superstructural' node) does not integrate networks, but rather is a
structure that brings together actors that represent networks in order to
concentrate the resources and technologies for the purpose of achieving a
common goal. Superstructural nodes are the command centers of
networked governance.
In broad terms nodal governance is an adaptive response to the
problem of information that confronts governance of all kinds, but
especially networked governance. Governance requires information. The
dramatic proliferation of new types and new scales of networks that has
been enabled by information technology means that the information that
matters to governance is dispersed through a multiplicity of networks many
of which operate independently of each other. No one network, public or
private, has information omniscience. The response of actors to this
complexity has been to find ways to link networks to produce new
structures of governance, a response that can be labeled nodal governance.
These structures do not bring information omniscience to actors, but they
do bring more information and importantly resources and technologies that
enable actors to become centers of governance. Nodes in the networked
world are organizational centers in time and space from which the actions
of governance flow.
Before showing how nodal co-ordination works for the enforcement of
intellectual property rights, we need a better view of the information and
co-ordination problems that face large corporate owners of intellectual
property. At the most basic level there has to be agreement amongst
individual corporations about which standards need to be strengthened and
enforced. There appear to some areas where one would expect to find
agreement such as increasing the duration of terms of protection. But even
here there will be differences of opinion amongst companies and industry
sectors. Lengthening the patent term matters to the pharmaceutical industry
but is less important to semiconductor chip manufacturers. A longer
copyright term is important to publishers but only provided it applies to
works already in existence. It hardly matters to software owners. There are
42 Castells, supra note 41, at 15.
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also fundamental questions about which parts of intellectual property
(copyright, patents, trademarks) to prioritize in the global quest for stronger
protection. Using the global intellectual property ratchet to set standards
requires, in other words, co-ordination on which standards are the important
ones. The ratchet also gives rise to other kinds of co-ordination issues.
When should the U.S. pull back from the WTO and shift the main game to
the bilaterals? Which countries should be the target of bilaterals? Which
countries should be the targets of enforcement action under the pyramid?
Individual U.S. companies with different investments and intellectual
property interests in different countries are likely to give different answers
to these questions. Pfizer may think that India should be the priority,
Microsoft may be most worried by piracy in Russia and neighboring
countries and Hollywood (in the shape of the American Motion Picture
Association) may think that the real problems lie in Italy, Malaysia and
China.
The U.S. trade enforcement pyramid is characterized by fine
gradations, giving the USTR many enforcement options. But running this
enforcement pyramid is a highly information-intensive exercise. Where,
for example, on the various levels of the pyramid does the USTR put the
Ukraine from year to year? How does the USTR know, for instance, that
the Ukraine is a hotbed of CD piracy? If the information comes from a
company how does the company know? If the Ukraine passes a law how
does the USTR know if it meets the U.S. test of being adequate and
effective? How does the USTR know that the law is being properly
enforced by Ukrainian police and the courts? Is it enough to rely on an
annual report by the Ukrainian police? If not, what is a credible source of
information? These kinds of questions have to be answered for the 80 or so
countries that now come under annual review by the USTR for their
practices on intellectual property.4 3
The way in which U.S. companies have approached these kinds of
basic information and co-ordination problems is to create a cluster of nodes
around the trade enforcement pyramid. Since only a small of number nodes
are involved the possibility of co-ordination amongst them becomes
possible. Coordination amongst the networks that the nodes represent
would create an almost intractable coordination problem because the
networks have hundreds of companies as members. The International
Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), for example, has a membership of
over 1100 companies and the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO)
43 In the case of the Ukraine the USTR eventually decided on the imposition of
prohibitive duties. See Determination of Action to Increase Duties on Certain Products of
Ukraine Pursuant to Section 301(b): Intellectual Property Laws and Practices of the
Government of Ukraine, Notices, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 67 Fed.
Reg. 120 (Jan. 2, 2002).
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has more than a 1000 member organizations. 44 The possibility of nodal co-
ordination has also been deepened by the fact that the nodes have
overlapping membership. The Business Software Alliance (BSA), for
example, is a key node on copyright issues and is also a member of the
IIPA and the Industry Functional Advisory Committee on Intellectual
Property Rights for Trade Policy Matters (IFAC-3), the committee that
advises Congress and the President on whether trade agreements meet the
goals of the U.S. on intellectual property. Sometimes the overlapping
membership occurs at the level of the individual wearing more than one
nodal hat. By way of example, Eric Smith, the President of the IIPA is also
the Chairman of IFAC-3. Diagram 3 shows the nodally coordinated
enforcement pyramid for intellectual property. (The full cluster of nodes
and their intersecting relationships are not represented for reasons of space
and clarity.)
44 Details of the membership of these associations are available from their websites. See
http://www.bio.org; http://www.iipa.com.
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Diagram 3 - Nodally Coordinated International Enforcement Pyramid
for Intellectual Property Rights
In Diagram 3 the dash arrows represent membership by one node of
another node (for example, Microsoft is a member of the IIPA, the BSA
and IFAC-3). The other arrows indicate that each of these nodes can work
and communicate directly with the USTR if the need arises. The thicker
arrows indicate that the relevant node also has an important coordinating
role. In the case of the enforcement pyramid for intellectual property
IFAC-3 has the most important coordinating role. It ties together more
networks than any other node and so is in the best position to deal with the
problems of co-ordination and information that were described earlier.
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IFAC-3 is a part of the private sector advisory system that advises and
influences U.S. trade policy. This system is made up of 33 advisory
committees that have provision for approximately 1,000 members.45 It is a
three-tiered system with the Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and
Negotiations at the top, six policy advisory committees in the second tier
and 26 sectoral, functional and technical advisory committees in the third
tier.
In a trade negotiation, information and expert knowledge is everything.
This is especially true in the case of intellectual property because the U.S. is
typically seeking to impose complex positive standards of law on a country.
This requires trade negotiators to know what are the gaps in standards or
even what are the interpretation of the standards in that country from the
perspective of U.S. law. Negotiators that are able to draw on expert legal
knowledge will have an advantage in a negotiation. The perspective of that
expertise has to come from industries that actually trade in intellectual
property related goods and know best the legal rules they want to impose on
their competitors in the other country. Every trade negotiator wants to
come home with trade gains.
In the case of trade agreements that relate to intellectual property, the
technical detail of these agreements is monitored by IFAC-3. The
membership of IFAC-3 is made up of 20 members drawn from Industry
Sector Advisory Committees and another 20 drawn from the private sector
areas who provide the committee with a large pool of expertise in
intellectual property. 46  Under its charter IFAC-3 is to provide detailed
advice on intellectual property issues in trade agreements negotiated by the
45 For a description, see The 2002 Annual Report of the President of the United States on
the Trade Agreement Program, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/
ReportsPublications/2003/2003_TradePolicyAgenda/assetuploadfile895_6140.pdf.
46 The members are, International Intellectual Property Alliance, The Gorlin Group, LawOffices of Hope H. Camp, representing Eli Lilly and Company, Cowan, Leibowitz &
Latman, P.C., Anheuser-Busch Companies, Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, LLP,
representing Biotechnology Industry Organization, Covington and Burling representing
Microsoft Corporation, Merck & Company, International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition,
Intellectual Property Owners Association, Pfizer, Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America, The Engineered Wood Association, Georgia-Pacific
Corporation, Business Software Alliance, Lark-Holton Global Consulting, Levi Strauss &
Company, Tuttle International Group, Procter & Gamble, Distilled Spirits Council of the
United States, Rubber and Plastics Manufacturers Association. See, e.g., Industry Functional
Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights for Trade Policy Matters (IFAC-3),
Advisory Committee Report to the President, the Congress and the United States Trade
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USTR.4 7 So, for example, in the case of the U.S.-Singapore FTA, 
IFAC-3,
in the words of its report, "advised U.S. negotiators on, and reviewed 
draft
texts of, of the U.S.-Singapore FTA intellectual property chapter.
' ' IFAC-
3 is a committee that gets its hands dirty by reviewing and drafting 
specific
agreements. Importantly, IFAC-3 reviewed the U.S.-Singapore FTA 
in the
context of other multilateral and bilateral agreements and initiatives 
that the
U.S. had achieved. It does this work across all U.S. trade 
initiatives in
intellectual property, whether bilateral, regional and multilateral. 
It is thus
able to co-ordinate at a technical level the work it does 
across these
different fora, thereby ensuring that U.S. trade negotiating initiatives 
push
intellectual property standards in the direction that U.S. industry 
would like.
The technical expertise on IFAC-3, as well as the expertise available 
to it
from the corporate legal divisions of its members, means that, for example,
it can evaluate a country's intellectual property standards in 
detail when
that country seeks WTO accession and it can provide detailed assessments
of the standards that USTR negotiators must bring home in a negotiation.
Formally, IFAC-3 must report to the President, the USTR 
and
Congress when the President notifies Congress of an intention to 
enter into
a trade agreement. This formal role, however, represents only 
a small part
of a more complex system of private sector nodal governance. Members 
of
IFAC-3 work outside of the committee to ensure that the U.S. 
remains
committed to an agenda of globalizing U.S. standards of intellectual
property. So, for example, the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization, which
is a member of IFAC-3, has over the years independently lobbied 
the USTR
on the question of intellectual property rights. Its agenda is a 
matter of
public record and is neatly summarized in a letter of January 29, 2003 
to the
USTR, Robert Zoellick: "[tihe United States' intellectual property system is
the best in the world, and BIO advocates the establishment of 
global
standards protecting intellectual property comparable to those in 
the United
States."49
Naturally, when BIO sits on IFAC-3 it brings its advocacy position
with it. A seat on IFAC-3 means that BIO is able, in co-operation 
with the
other members, to provide technical and drafting advice to the USTR 
as to
the kind of standards that meet the desires of the organizations that 
BIO
47 See U.S. Dep't of Commerce & the U.S. Trade Representative, Charter of the Industry
Functional Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights for Trade Policy Matters,
Mar. 18, 2002, available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/icp/Charter-
23
.html.
48 Industry Functional Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights for Trade
Policy Matters (IFAC-3), Report on the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA): 
The
Intellectual Property Provisions, sec. III, (February 28, 2003), available 
at
http://www.ustr.gov.assets/Trade-Ag
re e m en t s/ B i lat e ral/ S i ng apore FTA/ Reports/ass e t
-up lo
adfile273_3234.pdf.
49 Letter from Carl B. Feldbaum, President, Biotechnology Indus. Org. (BIO) to
Ambassador Robert Zoellick, U.S. Trade Rep. 
(Jan. 29, 2003), at
http://www.bio.org/iplaction/ 20030129.pdf.
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represents. There are a number of incentives for the USTR to be attentive
to the suggestions of IFAC-3, including the superior expertise of the
committee, the fact that the negotiating mandate in the Trade Act of 2002
requires the USTR to seek standards of protection comparable to U.S.
domestic law and that IFAC must ultimately write a report, as it did in the
case of U.S.-Singapore FTA, that endorses the agreement as being in the
economic interests of the U.S.. The upshot is that the standards that
members of IFAC-3 seek are very often the ones they achieve, especially in
bilateral negotiations where the U.S. almost always has superior bargaining
power. So, for example, BIO has urged that where there are delays by
trading partners in the granting of patents there should be compensatory
extensions of the patent term, and it has also advocated that trading partners
adopt U.S. standards of data protection for pharmaceutical products.
Articles 16.7 and 16.8 of the U.S.-Singapore FTA implement these U.S.
domestic standards in Singapore. BIO also works in other ways outside of
IFAC. For example, it responds to the USTR's request for public comment
on which countries should be the subject of 'Special 301' listing and as a
recognized international NGO in WIPO it can be active in pushing its
position on patents in the WIPO Patent Agenda process.
By clustering nodes around the enforcement pyramid and nodally
coordinating over its use, the key private sector players in the U.S. have
found a means by which to get other governments to take their obligations
on intellectual property seriously. IFAC-3 is not the only node that plays a
part in creating a culture of enforcement across the globe on intellectual
property. Other nodes and the networks they lead on this issue also provide
the USTR with information about piracy and infringement and make
suggestions as to the level of enforcement activity. The IIPA and the BSA
each file separate 301 reports and recommendations to the USTR. But by
virtue of being part of the same compact nodal structure they can coordinate
and project consensus to the USTR on vital issues. This in turn enables the
USTR to work out which governments are the most egregious offenders as
well as those that need lighter prodding on the enforcement of intellectual
property.
There is one last point to make about the relationship between nodal
governance and the enforcement pyramid. By concentrating resources
around the trade pyramid, corporate intellectual property owners have
increased the enforcement reach of the pyramid. The enforcement reach of
a pyramid is dependent upon obtaining information about non-compliance,
projecting consensus about its use and increasing the number of fora in
which it can operate. The more companies and networks that feed
information into the nodal structure about a country's practices on
intellectual property and the more countries about which there is
information, the greater the reach of the pyramid becomes. Diagram 4
below presents a simple case of the relationship between nodes and the
reach of enforcement pyramids.
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In this particular case when Node 1 alone is providing information
relevant to the deployment of the pyramid the enforcement reach is E-F.
When Node 2 joins it becomes B-C and when Node 3 joins it reaches A-D.
It does not follow however that increasing the number of nodes will always
lead to a commensurate increase in the enforcement reach of the pyramid.
Nodal co-ordination that is based on the creation of supra-structural nodes
such as IFAC-3 allows large and complex networks to pool resources and to
co-ordinate. The effect of this type of nodal co-ordination is to limit the
number of participating actors thereby economizing on the costs of co-
ordination and decision-making. As each node joins the relevant nodal
structure the costs of that linkage are outweighed by the benefits; however,
at some point that will cease to be true. The information that new nodes
bring will add little to information about enforcement, and the costs of co-
ordination and decision-making will rise. There is, in other words, an
optimum cluster of nodes for an enforcement pyramid.
The nodal structure for intellectual property has two important
contingent features. First, there are a comparatively small number of nodes,
f Jl
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but these nodes represent networks, some of which contain many members,
including many of the world's largest companies. What is being nodally
coordinated then are large networks that are powerful in terms of
information and resources. Second, the enforcement reach of this pyramid
is genuinely global. This has much to do with the fact that the enforcement
tools of the pyramid are based on access to the U.S. market, for the time
being the most globally influential market in the world. But the nodal co-
ordination of the pyramid itself increases its reach. For example, through
the strategy of forum-shifting to bilaterals that was described earlier, the
U.S. is able to set new and higher standards of intellectual property.
Importantly, each of these bilaterals comes with a set of institutional
arrangements for the enforcement of the agreement. 50 Through the creation
of new fora and standards that are TRIPS-plus enforcement activity under
the pyramid can reach a greater number of standards in a greater number of
countries. For instance, Article 6 of TRIPS says that for the purposes of
dispute settlement nothing in TRIPS can be used to address exhaustion
issues. But the U.S. can use FTAs to address the issue of exhaustion.
IV. Concluding Observations: The International Enforcement Pyramid and
Global Rent-Seeking
States have, over the course of history, progressively learned the
importance of securing the property rights of their citizens.51 States that, at
the most basic level, cannot offer their citizens secure property rights are
likely to experience no or little development because their citizens will
devote the resources they have to defending the property they have, and
there will be no incentive to accumulate more property, and foreign
investors will be more likely to stay away. This relation between property
and development takes the following simple sequence:
Sequence 1: Productive Property
property rights -) enforcement -> expectations of security -
economic development
However, to assume what is true at a general level of the institution of
property is true of all instances of property rules is to commit the fallacy of
composition. It is not the case, for example, that all the feudalistic rules of
tenure that English courts had to work with in the 1 7 th and 18 th centuries
were efficiently defined, even if the institutional evolution of property was
50 See, e.g., Australia FTA, supra note 14, at ch. 21.
51 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 6, at 54.
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key to England's economic success. 52 Property rules are not efficient per se
but rather by virtue of their incentive effects in given institutional contexts.
The rules of intellectual property are particularly difficult to design from
the point of view of efficiency because they involve trading off one kind of
efficiency for another. At base intellectual property rights involve the
designer in interfering in the market's capacity to diffuse and then
aggregate information for the purposes of competition. For this reason the
problem of unproductive property rights looms especially large in the case
of intellectual property rights. The sequence below illustrates the idea of
unproductive property.
Sequence 2: Unproductive Property
property rights - enforcement -> expectations of security
under-development/inefficiency
In the past the problem of unproductive property rights was confined
to national borders because sovereigns were only able to define property
rules for the territory over which they were sovereign. One of the features
of regulatory globalization has been that large U.S. corporations have
proven to be the most recurrently effective actors in enrolling the power of
states and of the most potent international organizations such as the WTO.
These corporations have been primarily responsible for the globalization of
intellectual property rules. They are, as we have seen, dealing with the
critical problem of the enforcement of these rules by means of an
international enforcement pyramid.
One clear danger of corporations being able to influence the definition
and enforcement of intellectual property rights is that they will steer that
definition and enforcement in directions that are profitable for them but
unproductive for some or all states. An example of a property rule that is
inefficient for all states is the extension of the copyright term to works
already in existence. The extension of the copyright term can only have an
incentive effect on future works, not works that are already in existence.
These works have already been socially purchased by the copyright term
that existed prior to the extension. In those cases where the copyright term
extension applies to works about to fall into the public domain, the cost of
continued monopoly pricing has to be worked out in present values rather
than discounted future values. Both the U.S. and EU have gone down the
path of copyright term extension.53 In recent preferential trade agreements
52 See Peter Drahos, Regulating Property: Problems of Efficiency and Regulatory
Capture, in REGULATING LAW 174-79 (Christine Parker et al. eds., 2004).
53 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298 (1998), available
at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/s505.pdf; Council Directive 93/98/EEC, 1993 O.J.
(L 290) ("harmonizing the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights").
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the U.S. is gaining copyright term extension as part of the deal. 4 Even
taking into account the fact that the U.S. is, through copyright term
extension, changing the terms of trade of copyright works in its favor,
copyright term extension is still probably inefficient for the U.S. Aside
from the costs to consumers there are also dynamic efficiency losses that
flow from copyright term extension. When a copyright work enters the
public domain other creators no longer have to face the transaction costs of
locating copyright owners or having to pay for the use of the work. They
are free to adapt and innovate with those works. Famous copyright works
that enter the public domain are, in effect, cultural standards for which there
is high demand by both creators wishing to adapt them for their own
projects and consumers who wish to see the final product. The effect of
extending the copyright term for works, especially those in the category of
cultural standards, is to restrict the supply of cultural invention compared to
the supply had the works not been the subject of copyright protection.
In other cases a global property rule may be inefficient for only some
states. India's success in building a strong pharmaceutical industry was
based in large measure upon its recognition ofpatents for pharmaceutical
processes, but not for pharmaceutical products. 5 This is precisely the kind
of nuanced approach to the definition of property rights that TRIPS
prohibits. It obliges states to recognize patents on products and processes
in all fields of technology.5 6 The current thrust by the United States in
preferential trading agreements to restrict the capacity of states to issues
compulsory licenses for patents is also likely to be inefficient for many
states.
The actual impact of unproductive intellectual property rights in an
economy is an empirical matter and will depend on the particular industry
structure in which the relevant right begins to operate as well as the
economic capacity of the country to absorb the efficiency losses caused by
the property right. In short, the damage will vary. The more fundamental
issue is whether the system of nodal governance that has evolved for the
setting and enforcement of intellectual property rights will deliver more
Type 2 sequences than Type 1. This is not an issue for discussion here, but
it is important to see that the system of nodal co-ordination that has been
described in this paper is a form of central planning for intellectual property
rights. A historically decentralized system in which states, merchants and
54 The recent U.S.-Australia FTA extends the term of copyright in Australia from life of
the author plus 50 years to life of the author plus 70 years for works, performances and
phonograms. See Australia FTA, supra note 14, at art. 17.4.4. The extension applies to
copyright works in existence at the date of entry into force of the agreement. Id. at art.
17.1.9.
55 Assad Omer, Access to Medicines: Transfer of Technology and Capacity Building, 20
WIS. INT'L L.J. 551, 559-60 (2002).
56 TRIPS, supra note 14, at art. 27(1).
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custom were all sources of standard-setting for property rights is being
replaced by centralized system of private nodal governance that draws upon
public nodes of authority such as the USTR to legitimate and enforce its
desired standards. The opportunities for rent-seekers have never been
greater.

